Euology for my mother, 2011-04-17

What I wrote (below the fold) does not match exactly what I said, but it is very close. My thanks for my father, my siblings, and their families for taking on so much of the effort to help memorialize my mother.

My mother is gone, but she is still alive as well. Her dutifulness, her caring, and her kindheartedness are visible in her children and grandchildren. She not only lived these traits in a way we all can remember, she passed them on gifts, offered not only as lessons, but also as examples for us to emulate. She enriched our lives with hers, and even in her passing, we are still the wealthier in spirit for having known her.

I don't ever recall Mom hesitating to make a personal sacrifice for someone else in the family. When money was scarce, she would find another job. When she felt one of Gram was lonely, Mom took her in. She would give money, cars, and furniture. We could always count on Mom to do or give whatever she could.

Mom always took a little time to give each of us some special attention. She played with babies, repeating the same thing over and over. Anytime someone needed advice, or wanted to play something in particular, or just needed a little extra attention, you could count on her for that. I remember one visit to the zoo; she noticed Nathan was getting irritated by the other kids, so she took him off on a trip with just the two of them. She would regularly tell about the games she was playing with her grandkids.

Mom tried to avoid saying a bad thing about anyone, at least in front of us. When people had let her down, or met her disapproval, she held her tongue, sometimes for years. Back when I was dating, she disliked strongly at least of couple the women she met, but I never found that out until long after they were out of my life. Of course, she did have the occasional gesture to let you know she wasn't saying something, a small shared joke and indication of respect for you or the person being discussed. Still, she kept her negative opinions to herself.

Mom always tried to help us find our own ways in the world, even when she didn't like them. She always told us that her parenting method was to "let go", to prepare herself for our growing independence. Each of us did grow, differently, according to who we were.

My mother will be with us all her life, even longer than we remember her, as we pass on the ways she affected us to those we in turn affect. I miss her terribly, even while she is all around me. I can't think of a better measure for a life than that.
Read more!

On the differences between deduction and induction

I’m finally taking the time to comment on a December post from the Maverick Philosopher, this one concerning the nature of deduction and induction. Dr. Vallicella makes some good points, but seems to overlook a key distinction.

Dr. Vallicella begins in a dialectic form, explaining why the usual notions of deductive reasoning moving from the universal to the singular and inductive moving from the singular to the universal are inadequate. I generally agree with his comments on this. However, I would hope in a discussion designed to illustrate reasoning, a better choice would be used for the example of a deductive argument that goes from the singular to the general than the use of a contradiction of singulars to derive a universal general, a usage even Dr. Vallicella acknowledges is artificial. A better choice would have been an argument that is at least hypothetically sound, rather than valid yet vapid. For example, from the singular propositions John is the only chess player born on Feb. 29, 1992 and John is fat, you could come to universal conclusion that every chess player born on Feb. 29, 1992 is fat without having to rely on a contradiction.

However, it is with the last paragraph that I find the thinking clumsy. In saying "To be a bit more precise, a deductive argument is one that embodies the following claim: Necessarily, if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is true", Dr. Vallicella basically removes the meat from the sandwich. A deductive argument is a demonstration of that relationship between the premises and the conclusion by the use the accepted rules of argumentation. That is the separation from the inductive argument, which makes no offer of demonstration except example. In the example of "All As are Bs; All Bs are Cs; ergo, All As are Cs", this is a straight-forward syllogism, and we use the rules of inference to determine it. My example is a little more complex syllogistically, but is straightforward in symbolic logic.

Also, while "the universal to the singular" and "the singular to the universal" are not strictly true, they are simplifications of a more accurate understanding of the scopes of the conclusions. For example, if you interpret propositions as statements about sets, deductive arguments are basically arguments that the set of the conclusion is a subset of the intersection of the sets containing the premises. That is, A∧B ⇒ C is another way of saying C ⊆ A∧B. So, deductive arguments go can decrease their inclusivity from premises to conclusion, but never increase it. Meanwhile, inductive arguments increase inclusivity, by extending membership in a set to something when it was not previously considered a member of that set. So, this is another good way of looking at the difference between deductive and inductive arguments, even if the word choice Dr. Vallicella rejected is inferior.
Read more!

Jerry Sloan -- a fond farewell

I haven't had time to write the post I planned to be next. I'm teaching Calculus for the first time, and I am putting a huge amount of effort into it, compared to previous classes I have taught. It's one of those situations where I'm not sure I can measure up to what the class needs. Still, if they let me, I'll be teaching it again. Mental growth comes from mental struggles.

However, I heard yesterday that Jerry Sloan resigned. From what I can tell, he just doesn’t have the energy it takes to constantly herd young players into trusting in his system anymore, and that's not really anyone's fault. I first started rooting for the Jazz in the mid 90s, so it's been quite a time. I'll briefly ramble on about it below the fold. Next post, I'll get back to the topic of the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning.

Sloan has always had arguments with players, some much more publically, and just as prominent within the franchise, as Williams. Karl Malone certainly comes to mind, although their disagreements were not as well-documented as those with Ostertag. Sloan seems to have always relied on personal drive, energy, and force of will to keep players playing the system. For better or worse, these things fade as you get older.

Great players tend to have big personalities, and Williams is no exception. You can't expect a man like that, at that age, to just take direction. There will be battles of wills, unless the coach has no authority at all, or just lets the players do whatever they want. Ten years ago, Sloan probably would have been more than up for those battles. In that time, he's been widowed, remarried, and has a knee replaced. Rather than just hang on (ala Don Nelson), Sloan has decided that if he can't be the coach he wants to be, he'd rather not coach at all. I respect that.

I will miss Sloan. I'm going to keep watching, though. I was watching last night, when Kirilenko showed just how good he was by getting injured. I don't know if the Millers will let Corbin coach for 20 years, but it wouldn't surprise me. I'm curious to see if Corbin takes up Karl Malone on his offer to be an assistant coach (I'm sure he'd have a thing or two to show Jefferson). I'm still a Jazz fan, just a sadder one, at least for this season.
Read more!

Son#1 plays Titan and goes to Disney World

I haven't about Son#1 for a while. Mostly, that's because even compared to a couple of years ago, he has changed so much. For those who weren't here or don't recall, he has been diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder, specifically Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified, or PDD-NOS. He was an unusual baby right from birth, although CharityBrow and I only realized it later. Some of his recent adventures, described below the fold, have brought him further on the path to having a "normal" life, whatever that is supposed to mean.

As I mentioned in a prior post, Son#1 has started working at a local TJ Maxx. The Disney World trip I mentioned occurred over Thanksgiving break. While Son#1 is not in the marching band, proper, he was chosen to help carry the banner before the band in the parade. He even got his picture in a local paper. He had a great time on the trip. Sure, there were some kids in the band who didn't like/understand him,and were afraid, but there were others who he could talk to and room with. He had previously gone on a trip to Kings Island a couple of years ago, and there were no problems then. However, it was nice to see him learn about saving his money for special things, that the hard work of learning the trumpet had benefits, and similar things.

Much more surprising was last weekend, when Son#2 pulled out Titan to play with CharityBrow and me, and Son#1 asked to join the game. Titan is a moderately complex game, certainly more so than the type you'll see at Wal-Mart. Son#1 hasn't played in a year. Yet he was able to figure out the recruiting charts, got the hang of movement on the master board, and even did OK on the battle boards. He handled setbacks well, and didn't crow about victories. CharityBrow and I are hoping to get him to play other games with us.
Read more!

A Maverick Philospher's quest for objective morality

Many theists believe there is an objective morality to be discovered. However, since you can't uncover such a morality in the same way you can lift a stone and find a pill bug, empirical systems are not use for this process. Instead, many rely on various works that they give implicit trust to, except when the advice of such books goes against their innate beliefs. Hence, we see homosexuals barred from military service, but don't see single women non-virgins barred in such a fashion, much less executed for being a single non-virgin.

Some attempt a seemingly more sophisticated approach of creating a morality based upon a few accepted notions and creating a formal system to reflect it. That's when you see people like the Maverick Philosopher examining the details on what their basic positions entail when examined in detail. Below the fold, I'll go into why I think this helps to pinpoint the inherent lack of objectivity in this construction of a moral system.

I'm not really concerned with the particular argument that Dr. Vallicella is making in his post, rather, I want to highlight what happens when he finds his argument is inadequate. In particular, he doesn't like the breadth of the conclusion of the argument, so he proposes a new starting point. That is, in creating this supposedly objective moral position, he changed his starting point to get the conclusion that he felt was the right one.

Now, I have no objections to this activity per se. In fact, this is one of the better advantages of operating strictly within a formal system. If the starting positions lead you to a situation you can't use, changing the starting positions is to be expected. If you are tracking the movements of ships on the surface of the earth, you don't pretend that the surface of the earth matches Euclid's parallel postulate; instead you assume that no lines (aka great circles) are parallel and use a Riemannian geometry. It will have the tools you need to look at ship movements around a globe.

However, the process of choosing these starting positions is strictly based on the conclusions you want to derive. That makes the starting positions arbitrary, and those positions will be carefully chosen so the results conform to the desired outcome. So, far from getting some objective morality that can be applied to all, you get a tailored morality designed to support a specific set of positions. Some of these systems, like natural law, were debated for hundreds of years before they were codified, and even then still generate disagreements around the edges.

When people come up with another method of knowing things that can exhibit certainty, reality, and demonstrability, that method of know may indeed lead to an objective morality. Until that time, there will be no such creature. All the construction within formal systems will not be able alter the shaky foundation upon which they rest.
Read more!

Strangers on a Train

Recently I was riding the Metro from downtown back across the river. Three ladies tried to get off at the East Riverfront station. but one of them had been sitting down, and couldn't get her walker organized and herself out of the seat in time to get through the door. They were at the back end of the train, so the driver was unaware of their situation. The door closed before they could leave the train, and naturally the ladies were very worried about getting back to their station. That's when the other passengers helped out -- sort of.

The ladies were not from the local area, and not used to riding the train. So, while the other passengers reassured them they could change directions at the 5th & Missouri station (the boarding area is conveniently in between the two directions there), they weren't sure how easily this could be done. I volunteered to escort the the ladies, and saw them safely back to East Riverfront. It was not a big deal, I had free time that day.

The reason I bring this up is to point out that I, and my fellow atheists, perform actions like this every day. We do it out of empathy, a desire to make the community a better place to live, a vision that the best world is run by people who help each other. People have always felt this way, since long before humans separated from the other apes.

One of the regular complaints I read is that atheists don't have some source for absolute morality to fall back on. While I usually engage that discussion by pointing out that there is no true, non-arbitrary source for morality (and there will be more on that in my next post), it's also worthwhile pointing out the opposite: humans don't need to taught morality by learning a set of rules or some arbitrarily imposed principles like natural law, they are taught morality by learning to see other humans as worthwhile and deserving of compassion, respect, and fair treatment. People who have an abundance of those qualities will behave morally, with or without an arbitrary set or rules/principles. People who lack those qualities will abuse and re-interpret any given rules/principles to behave immorally. Religious beliefs offer no advantage for moral behavior.
Read more!

Is "necessary" more than just a word?

The Maverick Philosopher blogged some thoughts designed to offer evidence that there are necessary beings. Overall, the argument relies on the common co-mingling of the formal and the real, between the description and an actual existence. We've looked at such arguments before, (for example, in this post) and in my series reviewing The Last Superstition. Proponents of the supernatural go to a great deal of trouble to convince us in the existence of archetypes for the descriptions we use for things, because they wish to use those archetypes to cast some being as the thinker of the archetypes. Here, the archetype is "necessary".

Dr. Vallicella breaks his argument down in 6 parts, which I will address in six paragraphs below the fold.

The first part gives the general idea of the descriptions of "contingent" and "necessary". It provides no reason to think of these descriptions as having any sort of independent existence, just as labels we might apply to various phenomena.

The second part introduces a new description, concrete (defined as objects which are or can be involved in causal chains/lattices) and abstract (things that by their nature make them not causally relevant. Non-physical items, such as emotional states, can still be concrete as long as it is possible for them to influence things. However, the items offered for abstracta seem curious. The claim is that ideas like "7 is a prime number" or the set containing Socrates (i.e., not Socrates himself, but the set containing him) are abstracta. Yet, if "7 is a prime number" is abstract, by definition that idea could not have resulted in Dr. Vallicella, nor me, typing that clause into the keyboard. Under these definitions, there are no abstracta that can be discussed, because to discuss them is to have them participate in causing the discussion.

The third part makes the case that there are necessary truths, offering the example that "7 is a prime number" is a necessary truth. As I have mentioned before, this is like claiming that "the Fool's Mate is the shortest chess game" is a necessary truth. People set up the rules of chess, just like people create the number system. There is nothing necessary about the rules we used to create the number system; we can change them at our convenience. So, I am actually unconvinced that necessary truths exist. Nonetheless, I will grant that for the sake of the rest of the argument.

The fourth part has a discussion of what a truth is (a true truth-bearer), and how such a thing can exist, by pointing out that neither marks on a paper nor a brain inscription can be true in and of themselves. Rather, it is the interpretation that we give to those marks, or that inscription, that is true or false. I think the phrase "true thought-bearer" or even "true proposition-bearer" would have been closer to what Dr. Vallicella is trying to convey. After all, if a bearer could only carry truths, it would not need the redundant description "true truth-bearer". Another point of disagreement is the need for there to be a proposition bearer at all. Propositions don’t need to be born to be true, they merely need to be born to be seen as true by the bearer. Especially if the truth is necessary, it will be true regardless of the existence of a bearer. This is another attempt to take a description, in this case "true", and impose some sort of underpinning or instantiation to it.

The fifth paragraph notes that since the marks/inscriptions are themselves contingent, the truths themselves might not be necessary. Applying modus tollens and the existence of necessary truths, Dr. Vallicella arrives at the conclusion there must be non-contingent proposition-bearers. This is where the underpinning attempted in the prior part bears fruit within Dr. Vallicella’s argument, and why the argument fails to be convincing to people who distinguish between descriptions and instantiations of descriptions.

The sixth arguments attempts a reducito ad absurbum on the possibility that all truth bearers are contingent, by using the notion that all descriptions are instantiated to show that, since a proposition can be conceived in any possible world, there must be something to conceive it within that world. It fails to be convincing for the same reason, namely, that there is no reason to think all descriptions are instantiated, so there does not need to be something to think a proposition in any particular possible world.
Read more!

The good and the bad, side-by-side

Within the past six weeks, I've been pleasantly surprised by three different websites that I usually disagree with. I have never shied away from vocally disagreeing with people, so the least I can do is extend a little credit from time to time.

Of course, each site has also said something jaw-droppingly stupid since then within the scope of my usual interests, so I'll take note of that, as well. I discuss the details below the fold.

At the beginning of the month, the Illinois Family Institute put together a surprisingly well-balanced take on the misnamed Ground Zero Mosque to kick the month off. Not only do they give, unequivocal support to the right of the Muslims to build the structure, they make a direct comparison to churches all over the country that are facing restrictions on building based on zoning codes. Sure, they forget to mention that some 60+ Muslims (not including the terrorists, of course) were killed on 9/11, but for the IFI, it's better than I ever expected to see. Of course, they have since followed it with the traditional confusion of being anti-bullying with pro-homosexual and some willful blindness to the funding priorities of Republicans in the midst of a rant where they somehow think there are no warnings in the media concerning promiscuous sex. Still, 1 out of 500 is better than 0 out of 500.

Just a couple of days prior to that, Martin Cothran of Vital Remnants showed unusually good judgment in his dismissal of Glenn Beck as a leader for the conservative movement, and more importantly to me, his confirmation of the fundamental personal credibility of Dr. King. There are rare occasions I think Cothran could be promoted from pure blog fodder to the "a little of both" category, that he might one day actually produce information that would be worth reading. Then, he drops a couple of truly stupid posts that arbitrarly criticize public pensions without examining overall total compensation at all and a little gem about Jerry Coyne pulling the last sentence out of context and portraying it as being about something else. With such poor investigative and reading skills, I see little chance of anything valuable coming from his site.

The earliest came from the keyboard of Dr. Feser, with a smack-down of the attempted rebranding of "suicide bomber" to "homicide bomber" by conservatives. While I disagree with his take on Dr. Vallicella (if not paranoid, Dr. Vallicella certainly seems pathologically fearful of Muslims, and his attempts to rationalize his fear bring me regular amusement), otherwise his post was clear and well-thought-out. Of course, that's not going to change his devotion to an outdated metaphysical system, such as exemplified in his incorrect generalizations on same-sex marriage or the grandiose claims regarding classical theism and it's importance today.

Even stopped clocks are right twice a day. Still, three such posts in less than month created quite a surprise for me.
Read more!

Richard

When I was first married, I was very poor at my chosen profession (teaching). So, I would often support myself (and help support my wife) with a variety of jobs, one of which working full-time at a Burger King franchisee for three years. I started as a management trainee, but my personality is ill-suited to be management, so I spent most of that time as a typical employee. One of the people I worked with was Richard. It never occurred to me at the time, at least not that I recall, that I might be looking into the future of my own children, in particular Son#1. Below the fold I'll talk about the man I met and worked with, what I knew about him, and what happened to him.

I don't know whether Richard was actually in the autism spectrum or not. I had barely heard of the disease at the time, and certainly didn't know what any of the most common characteristics were. I do remember that Richard was reliable and followed a routine very precisely, and that it was important to take a calm tone with him, all traits that Son#1 possesses. He was already at BK#1 (that is, the busiest store in the franchise) when I transferred in (as a regular employee, having trained at #2, and managed at #8 over the previous six months). He worked M-F, starting at 7am through the lunch rush. He took out the overnight trash, cleaned the outside lot, took a break, and then worked the fry bin. I got along fairly well with him, as he never goofed off nor tried to shirk his duties.

Richard had a twin brother Robert, who also worked at BK for a short period of time. Richard was very protective of Robert, who seemed less able to assimilate that Richard was, and so did not last long at BK#1. I was told they lived with their grandfather, in a house that was fully owned, so they were actually able to get by on minimum wage.

However, there finally came a day when, in the heat of the lunchtime rush, the manager yelled at Richard, and he couldn't handle it. He screamed at the top of his lungs and left the restaurant. The manager was quite shaken, and refused to rehire him. I did see him later, working in another restaurant, doing much the same thing.

Naturally, I wonder if this will be Son#1's life. Bosses who hire him out of pity and then fire him out of fear, moving from job to job without ever really progressing. Son#1 has made so much progress, and been through so many changes, that I think he will continue to do things that surprise me. Still, I worry.

Read more!

Productive dialog without honest dialog

The Maverick Philosopher is at it again, this time pondering whether "whether any productive dialog with atheists is possible" in his quest for all that is true (meaning Conservative and Christian, naturally). Oddly, my first thought was that a productive dialog would be much easier if he didn't delete every comment he didn't like on from his blog, despite their being direct and polite, but we can't expect too much from Dr. Vallicella, I suppose.

The Maverick Philosopher reintroduces many of the same misunderstandings as in his Teapot post, to which I posted a reply. As he is a reasonably intelligent man, it is hard to attribute his misunderstandings to something other than a self-induced blindness. Another great example is his post on the liberals playing the race card, where both he and the article of Thomas Sowell's to which he links manage to over look that the two biggest race cards played recently were by Mark Williams and Andrew Brietbart. I guess the race card only offends Dr. Vallicella when liberals play it. So, I'll address the usual misunderstandings of Dawkins point below the fold.

"Some of Us Just Go One God Further"

I've seen this quotation attributed to Richard Dawkins. From what I have read of him, it seems like something he would say. The idea, I take it, is that all gods are on a par, and so, given that everyone is an atheist with respect to some gods, one may as well make a clean sweep and be an atheist with respect to all gods. You don't believe in Zeus or in a celestial teapot. Then why do you believe in the God of Isaac, Abraham, and Jacob?

There is one way in which all gods are on a par: there is no reliable evidence for any of them. However, the quote here is not a statement of some necessary ontological status regarding gods. It is a challenge to apply consistent standards of evidence. Given that you reject personal testimonies for Zeus and Anansi, that you find their histories insufficient to believe in them, why do you accept evidence for Yahoweh that is not better in any non-subjective fashion?

What Dawkins and the gang seem to be assuming is that the following questions are either senseless or not to be taken seriously: 'Is the Judeo-Christian god the true God?' 'Is any particular god the true God' 'Is any particular conception of deity adequate to the divine reality?'

I can see no reason to say these questions are senseless or trivial to Dawkins. If they were, he would not have devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to writing a book on them. Dawkins was already a popular author of books on evolution, and his aggressive stance in favor of atheism has cost him some of that popularity. From all indications, Dawkins sees this cost as well-invested, because the issue is both capable of being intelligently discussed and important to address.

The idea, then, is that all candidates for deity are in the same logical boat. Nothing could be divine. Since all theistic religions are false, there is no live question as to which such religion is true. It is not as if there is a divine reality and that some religions are more adequate to it than others. One could not say, for example, that Judaism is somewhat adequate to the divine reality, Christianity more adequate, and Buddhism not at all adequate. There just is no divine reality. There is nothing of a spiritual nature beyond the human horizon. There is no Mind beyond finite mind. Man is the measure.

Well, it does seem trivial that if there is no divine reality, you can't be closer to it with one model of it than another model. However, I have not read anything by Dawkins that says "Nothing could be divine", rather, 'Nothing is divine' seems to be a much better summary of his position. There is no ruling out of any possible type of supernatural, only noting that there is no reliable evidence in favor of any sort of supernatural entity. I have never read a claim he can disprove the existence of an infinite mind, merely that there is no reliable evidence for such a mind.

Of course, this does not rule out the ability to disprove the existence of a particular model of the supernatural, many of which fall apart simply because they are bronze-age creations of people who did not possess what we would recognize as a consistent philosophy, which are then shoe-horned into our modern thoughts. For example, the notion of an omnibenevolent being who engages in eternal conscious torture for temporally limited offenses is inherently self-contradictory. You don't need to rule out the existence of all possible gods to rule out the existence of that particular god.

That is the atheist's deepest conviction. It seems so obvious to him that he cannot begin to genuinely doubt it, nor can he understand how anyone could genuinely believe the opposite. But why assume that there is nothing beyond the human horizon?

In my case, I assume there is plenty beyond the human horizon. There are galaxies we have not even seen yet, ideas about the beginning and possible end of time itself, infinities of space, and whole manners of natural phenomena that exceed our horizon. I accept them because we have evidence that they do or at least can exist.

My return question: why assume there is something out there that intends to be found but fails to leave any reliable evidence pointing towards it?

The issue dividing theists and atheists can perhaps be put in terms of Jamesian 'live options':

EITHER: Some form of theism (hitherto undeveloped perhaps or only partially developed) is not only logically and epistemically possible, but also an 'existential' possibility, a live option;

OR: No form of theism is an existential possibility, a live option.

That's easy: theism is absolutely a live option for the majority of atheists. Many of us find it the preferred option. However, the universe does not run itself based upon our preferences. Theism is a live option, but it is not an evidenced option. You can't just wish gods into existence.

Theist-atheist dialog is made difficult by a certain asymmetry: whereas a sophisticated living faith involves a certain amount of purifying doubt, together with a groping beyond images and pat conceptualizations toward a transcendent reality, one misses any corresponding doubt or tentativeness on the part of sophisticated atheists. Dawkins and Co. seem so cocksure of their position. For them, theism is not a live option or existential possibility. This is obvious from their mocking comparisons of God to a celestial teapot, flying spaghetti monster, and the like.

So, are we to equate the careful considerations of The Maverick Philosopher with the bold declarations of Dawkins as playing the same role in the social movements dedicated to their respective views of the supernatural? No, I don't think so. Dawkins is not The Maverick Philosopher for atheists. To the degree that we would have leaders at all, he is the James Dobson, the Malcolm X, or the Deepak Chopra: a public persona pushing an agenda. I'm sure Dr. Vallicella knows better than I who the serious atheistic philosophers are.

For sophisticated theists, however, atheism is a live option. The existence of this asymmetry makes one wonder whether any productive dialog with atheists is possible.

Well, I don't recall there being a lot of productive dialog with the James Dobson's of the world, either. Perhaps if you seek dialog, it should be with someone seeking to dialog. Dawkins is an advocate.
Read more!

Putting the Grim Philosopher argument to sleep

Now that we understand just what sort of thing a maximal collection of consistent truths must be, we can get around to discussing the attempt to form a contradiction based upon its possible existence, which argument The Maverick Philosopher (Dr. Vallicella) seems determined to support.

In fact, The Maverick Philosopher is so intent on preserving this argument that my comments pointing out a summarized version of my last post are no longer present. That is, I posted the first comment on 7/14, it was gone by 7/15, I posted another comment on 7/18 in the morning, I checked back on 7/18 in the afternoon to see it there, it was gone on 7/19, I sent an email on 7/19 asking why my comment was removed, and so far I have received no response to that email. I should not be surprised The Maverick Philosopher prefers to deal the disproof of his argument by covering up the evidence. After all, this is a man who, despite the presence of a dictionary definition that specifies "A strong fear, dislike, or aversion" as the definition of 'phobia', insists that "A phobia is an irrational fear. If you use the word in any other way you are misusing it. " Apparently avoiding the inconvenient is one of his preferred methods of dealing with reality. So, I'll have to produce the reality regarding his proof on my blog below the fold, where he can avoid it by not coming here at all. For someone who shakes in his boots at the idea of Muslims and thinks it rational, discretion is undoubtedly the better part of valor.

Addressing the 4 points in order:

1. Cantor's Theorem states that for any set S, the cardinality of the power set P(S) of S > the cardinality of S. ... But the proof needn't concern us. It is available in any standard book on set theory.

Quite accurate, assuming the power set can be formed. That's part of the issue with this proof. When you get to a certain size, a collection goes from being a set to a proper class. Depending on the particular set theory, this means either that, for some proper class V, either P(V) cannot be constructed (NBG and ZFC) or it cannot be larger than V (MK). Either way, Cantor's Theorem does not apply.

2. Suppose there is a set T of all truths, ... But according to Cantor's Theorem, the power set of T is strictly larger than T. So there will be more of those truths than there are truths in T. It follows that T cannot be the set of all truths.

As I demonstrated in the last post, the size of T is the size of the ordinal numbers, which is a proper class. So, there cannot be a greater cardinality in the class of all subclasses of T, even if such a subclass were to exist.

3. Given that there cannot be a set of all truths, the actual world cannot be the set of all truths. This implies that possible worlds cannot be maximally consistent sets of propositions. I learned the Cantorian argument that there is no set of all truths from Patrick Grim. I don't know whether he applies it to the question whether worlds are sets.

Since we have no disproof of the notion that there can be a class of all truths (such a class would exist under any typical rendition of set theory), it turns out that worlds can indeed be maximal collections of consistent truths.

4. As far as I can see, the fact that possible worlds cannot be maximally consistent sets does not prevent them from being maximally consistent conjunctive propositions.

This position requires at least some reason to differentiate between the category of consistent sets and the categroy of consistent conjunctive proposition, in that there are member of one which are not naturally a part of the other. However, there is an obvious and natural one-to-one relationship between the category of consistent sets and the category of consistent conjunctions. Namely, {p_i}_{i ε I} <---> &_{i ε I}(p_i). In fact, if you define a partial order on the category of consistent conjuction by sayin that &_{i ε I}(p_i) <= &_{j ε J}(p_j) whenever, for each i ε I, p_i ε {p_j}_{j ε J}, this relationship even preserves the partial order of the set category. This means any maximal consisent conjunction would map to a maximal collection of consistent propositions. So, if you say the maximal collections of sets does not exist, perforce the maximal consistent conjuction does not exist, either.
Read more!

A primer on transfinitie recursion

I am going to discuss a transfinite recursion in this post, as a prelude to filling in the argument from last July pointing out that the attempted argument by Dr. Vallicella against the possible existence of a maximal collection of truths, to which I wrote a response last July. Today, that response seems inadequate, so I intend to do the proof more comprehensively. That way, in the future I can just link to the new post whenever Dr. Vallicella decides to raise this argument again, as he did last week.

A good background in ordinal numbers generally will be very helpful for understanding this post. I will not attempt to improve on the three-part series penned by Mark Chu-Carroll over at Good Math, Bad Math. For better or worse, I'll assume the reader understands that material and go from there below the fold.

Transfinite recursion is the process of defining a function over all of the ordinals. Recursive definitions are fairly common at the level of the finite. For example, the factorial function (identified by a bang, for example, 3!) comes up in pretty much any college level math class that mentions probability. Factorials can be defined recursively. You start off saying 0! = 1. Then, for any integer n > 0, n! = n * (n-1)!. Thus,

1! = 1 * 0! = 1 * 1 = 1.
2! = 2 * 1! = 2 * 1 = 2.
3! = 3 * 2! = 3 * 2 = 6.
4! = 4 * 3! = 4 * 6 = 24.
5! = 5 * 4! = 5 * 24 = 120.

This is not the only way to define n!, but it is a useful way. This definition consisted of two steps: the definition for 0, and the definition for any number given the value for the immediately previous number.

With transfinite recursion, the same basic idea applies: for any particular ordinal ω, you use the definitions of some or all the ordinals β where β < ω to define the function on ω. If you can do that as a single definition, so much the better, but often these definitions consist of three steps: define the function for the first ordinal (0), define the function for each ordinal that has a direct predecessor (the are called successor ordinals), and define the function for ordinals that have predecessors, but no direct predecessor (these are called limit ordinals). As you might have noticed, the first two steps are the same as we saw for the definition of factorial. I will be using transfinite recursion to start with a single truth t, and generate from that a maximal collection of consistent truths T that derive from t. "Maximal" means: given any collection T_x of truths derived from t, T_x is a subset of T.

The first step of the transfinite recursion is simple: T₀ = {t}. T₀ is very obviously derived from t.

Edit: In my discussion in the next paragraph, I glected to account for the fact that T_β+1 will contain every truth in T_β even without being unioned. This is corrected.

The next step will be to define T_β+1 given some T_β derived from t. Of course, I will use the definition offered by Dr. Vallicella in his proof, otherwise there would be no point to this. T_β will consist of truths, {t_β,1, . . . , t_β,i, t_β,i+1, . . ., t_β,ω} that derive from t. Consider the power set P(T_β) of T_β. The truth t_β,1 in T_β will be a member of some of T_β's subsets but not of others. Thus, t_β,1 ε {t_β,1, t_β,2}, and t_β,1 ~ε { } are both truths. In general, for each subset s in the power set P(T_β) there will be a truth of the form t_β,1 ε s or t_β,1 ~ε s. You can denote whichever of these statements is true by q(t_β,1,s). We then define T_β+1 = {q(t_β,i,s) | t_β,i ε T_β and s ε P(T_β)} union {t}, and say that T_β+1 is also derived from t. This is the process Dr. Vallicella uses to generate a larger set. Note that since every statement of T_β is repeated in T_β+1, T_β is a subset of T_β+1.

Before we move on, lets look at T₁ and T₂. T₀ has two subsets, {} and {t}, and one element, {t}. t ε {t} (we can call this truth t_1,1) and t ~ε {} (we can call this truth t_1,2). Then, T₁ = {t, t_1,1, t_1,2}. T₁ has eight subsets: {}, {t}, {t_1,1}, {t_1,2}, {t, t_1,1}, {t, t_1,2}, {t_1,1, t_1,2}, and {t, t_1,1, t_1,2}. With three elements of T₁ and eight subsets of T₁, we can generate 24 true statements of the form t_2,j, 1<= j <= 24, two of which were in T₁ (left as an exercise for the interested reader). T₂ will consist of these 24 statements, and t, for twenty-five truths. In case you are curious, there are 25*2^25+25 (i.e. 838,860,825) statements in T₃.

The third step is simple. For any limit ordinal ω, T_ω is the union of all the T_β where β < ω. Since all the statements of each T_β are derived from t by the process in the previous paragraph, every element of T_ω is derived from t.

The (proper) class of all of all ordinals is commonly called Ω. So, for each ω ε Ω, we have defined T_ω. T is the union of all the T_ω over all the ω ε Ω. T is now the maximal collection of truths derived from t. Since for any ordinal ω, #(T_ω) >= #(ω) (that is, T_ω at least as many elements as ω), T has more elements than any ordinal. Therefore, T must be a proper class. I'll discuss what this means in my next post.
Read more!

At the old ball game

Recently, Son#1 went to see the Cardinals, by himself. His school's (marching?) band was scheduled to play there, and while he is not in that particular band, he wanted to be there to support them. Unfortunately we couldn't buy tickets through the band teacher due to pressing financial issues at that time. So, Son#1 went downtown to get his own tickets ahead of time. Needless to say, this opened up a flood of conflicting emotions in CharityBrow and me.

First was pride. Son#1 had never been further than a couple of miles from home on his own (he takes a bus to his job at a local department store). This time he took a bus to the MetroLink and then took the MetroLink to the stadium, some 15 or miles away. He never hesitated, showed no fear, and took everything in stride. He called regularly so CharityBrow and I would not worry. In fact, when it turned out the box office was closed on his first visit (a couple of days before the game, the Cardinals were out of town), he didn't get upset. He just turned around and came home. When he got home, he asked me what time he should leave on game day, and we went over the schedule together. On game day, he left on time, bought his ticket, found his seat, watched the game, and came home by a different route than the one he used to get to the game (due to the late-night buses running slightly differently). Ten years ago I had no idea he would ever be able to do these things. Heck, eleven years ago he was still in diapers at age seven.

Of course, there was a lot of fear on my part, as well. CharityBrow and I have always seen Son#1 as an easy target for predators. He trusts pretty much everyone he meets and thinks of them as his friend, at least until they do something mean. He'll hug girls he's never met, always with a big smile. He once left a bicycle unlocked across a park at night, because he never thought it might get stolen. So, we worried about someone offering him a ride and us never seeing him again.

For Son#1, I'm not sure it was even a big deal. Going to the game was a big deal, but the fact he did it on his own, not so much. In that way he's a lot like me. I started taking BiState (now MetroBus) to school in the fifth grade, and never though much of it. Wandering was always part of the fun. I would worry my parents greatly from time to time because of that. In that aspect, I suppose the parent's curse holds true: he is doing to me what I did to them. Should I feel good about that?
Read more!

Exploring the urban prairie

I work in East St. Louis, and on occasion move around the city from time to time either as a part of my job, or just to get a bite to eat. So, I get to see a fair share of urban prairie. As an urbanite, I find it rather depressing. I'll say a little more about it below the fold.

There is an interesting variety to the prairie. Sometimes the grass is so thick and high you'd never know anything had been built there at all. For example, along 13th between Exchange and Lynch there are multi-lot sized sections of meadow, which currently feature some wild, pretty, blue flowers (as of yesterday, anyhow). Other times, you can still see large patches of asphalt or concrete that have not yet successfully been buried, such as along State street between 81st and 85th. Presumably, much of this land belongs to the city. So, not only does the city need to pay for whatever upkeep there is on the property (the grass does need to be cut every month or so, at least along State Street), but it brings in no revenue. As more and more land becomes deserted, it becomes harder to support basic services for the remaining residents.

I wonder how long this can continue. Unlike East Coast cities, we still don't have land shortages here in the Midwest. So, O'Fallon, Shiloh, Troy, etc. are all growing, talking about getting new interstate exits, etc., while land much closer to St. Louis languishes. Eventually, the USA will have enough population pressure that this land will be used again. I wonder how long that will take.

Some of the land is apparently going to community gardens. In the next 50 years, we'll see full-scale farms? Can the latest 10 million help reverse the trend? I wonder if I will se a turnaround in my life time (based on family history, another 40 years or so).
Read more!

The Reluctant Atheist meets The Fly

I am a reluctant atheist. Every time I read about some new proof of the existence of God/gods, I get a little bit of hope that I will be able to return to belief. So, when I reviewed Dr. Edward Feser’s The Last Superstition (you can read the series by clicking on the label link in the labels list), it was with the hope that there was some substance behind the show, that the tone of contempt shown toward atheists had a basis in real proof. Instead, a careful examination made it clear to me why Aristotlean-Thomasian metaphysics (abbreviated A-T hereafter) had been abandoned, or at least (since I don’t know the actual history of the field) why it will never again dominate metaphysical thinking. Below the fold, I use Dr. Feser’s speculations concerning the metaphysical implications of the movie The Fly to show where I think A-T is giving a poor description, and where Dr. Feser himself doesn’t seem to be using A-T very well. I will assume my readers have read Dr. Feser’s post first.

I will start out agreeing with Dr. Feser’s caveats that with very few actual facts to work with, all of this is speculation. However, I believe that Dr. Feser and I agree on all of the relevant facts, so that should not be an issue.

When addressing the question of whether BrundleFly is human, I think there is another categorization that could have been used to separate distinct concepts and clear up aspects of this classification: person. If we slightly change the traditional A-T definition to "a person is a rational animal", and perhaps "a human is a member of homo sapiens sapiens", with the acknowledge that in A-T, every human has the form that is a person, and therefore is a person, that will clear up much of the confusion. BrundleFly is certainly a person, as Dr. Feser’s descriptions the reasoning behind BrundleFly’s actions makes clear. However, BrundleFly is not a human. He has no evolutionary history when he steps out of the teleportation chamber, he is a type of Swampman or at the very least a hybrid. You are a member of a species based on your line of descent. I could be mistaken, but I believe Dr. Feser would not say that a mule is a horse.

Both of Dr. Feser’s arguments that try to support saying 'BrundleFly is human' actually go against the grain of A-T philosophy. While Dr. Feser assert the retention of reason as a means of asserting humanity, you first have to ask: does BrundleFly still have the form of a human? If you persist in saying that, for living thing, the form is what the living thing attempts to reach, then BrundleFly’s transformation does not deform him, it brings him closer to his true form. The second argument, that "human" should cover any sort of rational animal, serves merely to conflate different concepts. What makes Dr. Feser’s insistence even more self-contradictory is that, for him, there is a regularly occurring event where two living things with distinct DNA strands merge, which event Dr. Feser insists without equivocation produces a new living thing with a new form, different from either of the prior living things.

As for his discussion of what might have happened if BrundleFly has successfully merged with Veronica and her unborn child, the notion that two independent souls might survive in BrundleFly makes for some interesting interpretations for real-world human chimeras and monozygotic twins. Do chimeras really posses two souls, according to Dr. Feser? Do identical twins share a single soul between them? Those are the natural implications of his thoughts.

The reason Dr. Feser and I can start from the same facts, and come to completely opposite conclusions about Brundlefly within A-T, is that the A-T uses the non-factual determination of form to reach its conclusions. While I made what I felt was a reasonable argument that Brundlefly’s form was not human, that does not constitute proof, and in fact form cannot be proved. It can’t be measured, verified objectively, or pulled out by a process. The determination of a form is basically arbitrary, the most people can achieve is to agree to the same arbitrary designations to achieve consistency. That’s why A-T will never supplant the metaphysics of science today. It brings subjectivism to what is intended to be an objective process.
Read more!

My son's job

I said earlier that I would discuss what Son#1, who has an autism-spectrum disorder, does to make money. Since I don’t make many posts that are only one sentence long, I will also take the time to discuss what I have seen of him at work, what his teachers have passed back as the feedback they receive, what doing this means for Son#1 (and us), and what I think this means for his future, below the fold.

His job is at TJ Maxx. It is his first job, and he was hired through a special program at the school. He works 1 or 2 afternoons a week, just under four hours at a time. He is responsible for putting merchandise back on the shelves, making sure that it is properly folded, sorted, or matched as needed. These tasks play very well into his strengths. These tasks deal with concrete objects, as opposed to abstract objects or people, require physical manipulation, and result in a nicely structured and patterned display. I have observed him at work once or twice when he did not know I was there. He moves quickly from place to place, and pays close attention to what he is doing and the final result.

According to his teachers, the store is very pleased with Son#1. While he is now an adult, so it’s not really my place to ask for personnel records (in fact, CharityBrow and I are now merely advisers at his school progress meetings, Son#1 is now in charge of his school plan), his teachers have informed me that he was nominated for Employee of the Quarter. They have continued to schedule him even though the school year is over, and have apparently indicated that they want to keep him after graduation. While I have always known that I have a determined, hard-working son, it’s quite a relief to see other people appreciate those same qualities. We’ve had some bad experiences in that regard, in particular at the church Son#1 attends, where they told him he could no longer volunteer at their Vacation Bible School (Maybe I’ll rant on that another day). While I want all my kids to succeed, there is a certain anxiety with regard to Son#1, and it’s nice to have that partially alleviated. You can make a living stocking shelves.

Then there is the money. Son#1’s first priority is a trip to Disney World with the band, and he is contributing half the amount needed every month (we contribute the other half). In addition, he makes regular trips on his bicycle by himself to buy himself little things: a soda here, a bag of chips there, perhaps some ice cream instead. He is primarily a saver, though. When he is out of money, it’s because he has lent it to us (don’t worry, he gets a very good rate of interest).

Son#1’s ultimate goal is still to be a band teacher. I think he has a chance to do, but it will take him longer than it might take other people. In the meantime, he’ll be able to pay for school, buy himself clothes, and generally enjoy his life while trying to make it better. There’s not much more I could ask for.
Read more!

Thoughts on the last Jazz season

I just wanted to take a little time to talk about my reaction to the 2009-2010 season for the Utah Jazz. Overall, I was very pleased with the results. I think the Jazz took a couple of important steps forward. The series against the Lakers was disappointing, but that was more than balanced by other events, in my mind.

Before the season started, I had predicted the Jazz would win 54 games. They actually had 53 wins, so I was satisfied with that. More importantly was that a few of the wins showed they made real progress as a team. They beat San Antonio in San Antonio, for the first time in about a decade, and then did it a second time, sweeping the season series. They tied Denver for the division lead. They took a couple of close games on national TV, and came back from 25 points down in one game. All of this points to a team that is maturing, especially the three best players of Williams, Kirilenko, and Boozer (I think pretty much in that order).

The Jazz front office made some good moves as well. Keeping Millsap helped insure they had one of the better benches in the league. Okur was signed for another couple of years. I think ideally Okur would be a great sixth man, able to come off the bench and play inside or out to give the bench different look. However, he has certainly played better than any other center on the team, and I’d rather know he will be here than relay on Koufos, Fesenko, or undrafted Rookie X to start games. They turned a couple in mid-level draft picks of marginal value (Maynor and Brewer) into significant tax relief. They found and signed the best undrafted player (Matthews). While neither of the D-league signees showed great talent, they were integrated into the Jazz system and made minor contributions. Since I usually put the draft and free-agent signings as the beginning of the season, who they draft in 2010 and whether they can keep Boozer doesn’t factor into this analysis.

In the playoffs, the Jazz beat a full-strength Denver in Denver for the first time in a few years, and without two of their best four players. Not only was that another important milestone, but it also highlighted just how good Sloan is. Probably over the past four of five years, the importance I gave to NBA coaches was gradually diminishing. While I still think that talent tends to win out in the end, the Denver series showed that a well-coached squad can override superior talent on a poorly-coached squad.

Then came the Lakers, and it was disheartening. The Lakers are considerably more talented than the Jazz, especially with the Lakers at full strength and with the Jazz still missing two of their best four, and Jackson will never be outcoached to the degree Dantley was. Still, not only were the jazz swept, but in three games it seemed like the Lakers were doing whatever they wanted, whenever they wanted. I will get real pleasure out of beating the Lakers in some future playoff series, but I don’t see that happening for a couple of years.

So, overall I thought the Jazz were a great team to root for this past year, and I’m looking forward to the 2010-2011 season.
Read more!

Prom night

Son#1 is a high-school junior this year. At his school, both juniors and seniors can attend the prom, so he took his own hard-earned money and bought a prom ticket (I'll save the discussion for what he did to make his money "hard-earned" for another post). He was at the dance for four hours, and then I drove him to the after-prom at a local bowling alley, where he stayed for another five hours. I finally picked him up just before 5 am.

Charity (short for CharityBrow, which my wife has as an online time from time to time) was worried about him for weeks leading up to the prom. What if kids pick on him? What if he gets confused and forgets how to call home? What if some less-than-honorable kids offer him a ride (a recurring demon we both suffer from)? I had a little more confidence, in that I at least persuaded her we needed to let him attend, but I won't pretend I didn't worry about the same things. However, none of that happened. He danced, and a couple of times even danced with a girl. He kissed a girl on the cheek. He bowled. He called when he was done dancing, and again when he was done bowling. Each time, he had a huge smile on his face because he had so much fun.

Because he's the oldest, I still wonder how my worries for him will compare with the other four. I think my mother worried as much about my youngest sibling (#4) as about me (oldest), at least in the out-late-at-night situations. Will I worry as much about Sons#2-3 and Daughters#1-2? If I don't, how much of that is because of experience, and how much is because their problems are much more manageable than pdd-nos (although the ADHD of Daughter#1 isn't that far off)?

Son#1 wants to take driver's education next year. I don't know how I feel about that, either. It's been hard enough trying to sit in the passenger seat when Son#2 (who is 16) is driving. Still, I plan to let him go to college and try to become a band teacher. If he can do that, I should probably at least give him the chance to learn to drive. Maybe.

If I thought that the questions would ever end, this would be easier to deal with. But I don't think they ever do.
Read more!

Back to posting

Sorry about my recent hiatus. My day job got a little busier, and it can be hard to get time on the computer at home. In times of vanity, I think I may be disappointing as many as a dozen people.
Read more!

Maybe the answer was no, after all

Martin Cothran did me the favor of correcting my usage of English as a part of his response to an earlier post. I somehow mixed 'disparagements' and 'aspersions' into the accidental portmanteau 'dispersion', even though there is a homonym with no relation at all to the meaning of 'aspersion' or 'disparagement'. Frankly, it would not surprise me at all if Cothran can "speak it [English] more competently than I". Certainly, one of his duties for the Kentucky version of Focus on the Family is to make speeches, and I have no such experience. Although, since I don't believe he has ever heard me speak, he probably meant write, and I would not be surprised if he did that better, as well. Since my original comment was quoted as "It turns out his English is not nearly sufficient to warrant [Cothran's] casting of dispersion on other posters, or maybe it's his grade-school-level-science that is lacking", I have no problem accepting it's a matter of grade-school-level-science.

So, that's probably a couple of tally marks on his side of the ledger. Of course, based on his post, on my side of the ledger there would be the ability to apply logic to a daily situation, the ability to separate experts from non-experts, an ability to better read English, and a grasp of the differences between short-term and long-term phenomena. I'll address those points below the fold. Of course, I probably shouldn't be keeping score, that's just the gamer in me coming out.

The first point, Cothran's apparent inability to apply logic to a daily situation, is pointed out by Cothran's continued confusion of temperature with precipitation (not to mention apparently missing the implication of the "or" in the quote above). While Cothran is busy blogging about snow levels, 2009 was the second warmest year in the modern era. That means that every year of 2000-2009 is in the top twelve years, IIRC. It seems a simple concept: you measure warmth by looking at temperatures. Even in grade school we learned the difference between a rain gauge and a thermometer. Of course, Cothran teaches as a Christian school, so science is probably low in their curriculum priorities. At any rate, given his continuing difficulties distinguishing between precipitation and temperature, maybe he would refuse to wear a coat in a freezer.

For the second point, who does Cothran point to as authorities making predictions concerning global warming? Politicians. When I want advice on how a law is made/executed/adjudicated, I'll go to a politician. When I want direction on a scientific prediction, I'll go to scientists. I'm just crazy that way.

Of course, some people are probably thinking to themselves that Cothran did also link to an IPCC report. This is indeed a good authority, and if Cothran was not lacking in his basic ability to read English, he might have even interpreted this authority correctly. However, contrary to the assertion "But it's the IPCC saying that Global Warming is inconsistent with increased snowfall", there is not one part of that article which predicts decreased overall snowfall. In fact, the article specifically predicts increased precipitation, and lists snow as one type of precipitation that will increase. For example,

Because precipitation comes mainly from weather systems that feed on the water vapour stored in the atmosphere, this has generally increased precipitation intensity and the risk of heavy rain and snow events.

The only place where reduced snow is mentioned is

As temperatures rise, the likelihood of precipitation falling as rain rather than snow increases, especially in autumn and spring at the beginning and end of the snow season, and in areas where temperatures are near freezing. Such changes are observed in many places, especially over land in middle and high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, leading to increased rains but reduced snowpacks, and consequently diminished water resources in summer, when they are most needed. Nevertheless, the often spotty and intermittent nature of precipitation means observed patterns of change are complex.

So, the prediction is for more precipitation overall, including heavy snow, but in the spring and autumn and in a couple of geographic locations some of the snow will be replaced by rain. This was a very readable and accessible document that Cothran completely inverted the meaning of.

Finally, we get to the difference between long-term and short-term phenomena. One extra-hot year one continent is not proof of global warming. So far, the overall temperature increase since the 1960s is less than two degree Celsius, well with typical temperature variation on a single continent from year to year. By the same token, even if 2010 was a cold winter, one cold year on one continent is not proof against global warming. However, we don't even have a cold month here: February 2010 was one of the hottest Februarys ever (again, the difference between temperature and precipitation). So, here is my response to the challenge

Now maybe One Brow could explain how more snow at lower latitudes is consistent with Global Warming.

It's really quite simple: we had more snowfall at lower latitudes and one of the warmest Februarys ever. That occurred at the same time, therefore they are consistent. QED

Maybe, when he has time, Cothran will use his superior English writing skills to tell me how it can be disadvantageous to have a scientific theory? I am much more interested in that question than in climate, frankly.
Read more!