Quote of the Week, 2015-01-28

Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral disposition) to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds (as art), but reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells in him.

A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, V. Explanation of these two Notions, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

Retrieved from Project Gutenberg

This notion of some distinction between our animal (presumably, this refers to properties we seen in many animals that are not human, as well as humans) nature and our humanity (presumably, this refers to we seen in humans, but not at all or to a limited degree in other animals) does a disservice to both concepts. Our humanity is bound into our animal nature, part and parcel, not truly distinguishable, and both types of properties benefit from this relationship.

Our love of our fellow human (admittedly not universally present) and our social nature is a direct result of our animal nature, since we are social animals. Our ability to organize in large groups is the primary reason we dominate other large predators, and we would not organize into such groups were we not social.

Our ability to create and communicate abstract notions is a direct result of this social need. Every social animal uses social signaling. With our animal nature, our intelligence would lay fallow, having neither exercise nor purpose.

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Quote of the Week, 2015-01-21

It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is just in this that the perfection of another man as a person consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no other but himself can do.

IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

Retrieved from Project Gutenberg

So long as another person can set his goals before himself according to what he believes is his duty, he will be perfected? I can think of a few ways that this is insufficient, and in many of these ways, people can be assisted to their own perfection, and it is quite reasonable to make assisting such people a duty.

First, some notions of duty are harmful. Feeling duty to an evil government is harmful. Feeling duty to social conventions that degrade people are harmful. Feeling duty to purely toxic family members is harmful. There is no contradiction in taking, as one of our own ends, the convincing of another person that they have chosen duties that are harmful, and to assist them in the ability to discriminate between harmful and helpful duties. This would be a duty we had toward the perfection of other people.

Second, people can not rationally choose duties to follow without learning to think rationally. It's not enough to say have a duty that is helpful, we need to understand how to advance such a duty in our lives, and which of our behaviors tends to support that duty. This instruction would also be a valid duty to undertake to support the perfection of another.

Thirdly, parents have a duty to raise their children in a fashion to help their children to their own perfection.

I could go on, but I think these examples suffice to point out that the perfection of others can be, and often is, a duty of ours.

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Quote of the Week, 2015-01-14

We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in themselves duties for the same person.

For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty, for this is a constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power.

IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

Retrieved from Project Gutenberg

People don't inevitably will happiness of themself. Some seem determined to undermine their happiness; others pursue lives through habits that bring them no pleasure. At the very least, each person has a duty to themself to determine what will bring happiness, and allow themself the habit of acting in such a fashion from time to time. This quote seems to positively disregard human behavior.

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Quote of the Week, 2015-01-07

Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to make his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a priori in pure practical reason.

III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, by Immanuel Kant

Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

Retrieved from Project Gutenberg

There is no such thing as "pure practical reason", unless we include reasoning whose beginning is based in empirical knowledge. By itself, reasoning is manipulating hypotheses into conclusions. It offers no guarantee of the truth of these hypotheses, just the occasional ability to possibly discover that certain combination of hypotheses can't be true at the same time. Even that is not a reliable occurrence.

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